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abstraCt
The United Nations Convention on the Law of  the Sea (UNCLOS) con-
solidated considerable powers for coastal states. Such codification did not 
come on a plate, but derived from continuous opposition to historical hege-
monisms in the seas. This paper offers an alternative account of  the expan-
sion of  coastal state jurisdiction by differing from the traditional narrative 
which emphasizes the subversive and disruptive nature of  coastal states’ 
jurisdictional assertions prior and during the III United Nations Conference 
on the Law of  the Sea. Traditional scholarship often alarmed against “ter-
ritorialism” and the “creeping jurisdiction”, while shielding the principle of  
freedom of  the seas. In this context, Brazil attracted plenty of  criticism for 
its prominent role in thrusting coastal state’s authority seaward. This paper 
adopts a historiographic perspective on key developments of  international 
law of  the sea and analyzes the Brazilian practice on the issue between 1945 
and 1982. At the end, two main conclusions are reached: Brazil has been 
more of  a catalyst for change than a provocateur of  the ordre publique océa-
nique; secondly, were it not for creeping jurisdiction before the adoption of  
UNCLOS, the international community would still collude with a regime 
of  “spoliative jurisdiction”, a practice as old as the law of  the sea’s colonial 
origins. The practical implications of  this argument are that some behaviors 
often dismissed as “creeping jurisdiction” maybe tolerated in light of  the 
context in which they occur and the values at stake. 
Keywords: Law of  the Sea. Territorialism. Creeping Jurisdiction. Coastal 
State Jurisdiction. Brazilian State Practice.
resumo
A Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre o Direito do Mar (UNCLOS, 
em inglês) confirmou poderes consideráveis  para os Estados costeiros. Tal 
codificação não foi regalada, mas resultou da oposição contínua a hege-
monismos históricos no mar. Este artigo oferece um relato alternativo da 
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expansão da jurisdição do Estado costeiro, diferindo da 
narrativa tradicional que enfatiza a natureza subversiva e 
disruptiva das pretensões jurisdicionais desses Estados, 
antes e durante a III Conferência das Nações Unidas 
sobre o Direito do Mar. A doutrina tradicional alarmava 
reiteradamente contra o “territorialismo” e a “jurisdi-
ção rastejante”, ao tempo em que blindava o princípio 
da liberdade dos mares. Nesse contexto, o Brasil atraiu 
muitas críticas por seu papel proeminente na expansão 
da autoridade do Estado costeiro sobre o mar. Este ar-
tigo adota perspectiva historiográfica sobre os princi-
pais desdobramentos do Direito Internacional do Mar 
e analisa a prática brasileira sobre o tema entre 1945 e 
1982. Ao final, duas conclusões centrais são alcançadas: 
o Brasil revelou-se mais um catalisador de mudanças do 
que um desestabilizador da ordem pública oceânica; em 
segundo lugar, não fosse pela jurisdição rastejante pré-
via à adoção da UNCLOS, a comunidade internacional 
ainda conviveria com um regime de “jurisdição espo-
liativa”, prática tão antiga quanto as próprias origens 
coloniais do Direito do Mar. Decorre desse argumento 
que algumas condutas estatais, muitas vezes rotuladas 
como “jurisdição rastejante”, possam ser toleradas à luz 
do contexto em que ocorrem e dos valores em jogo.
Palavras-chave: Direito do Mar. Territorialismo. Juri-
sdição Rastejante. Jurisdição do Estado Costeiro. Práti-
ca Estatal Brasileira.
1. introduCtion
Of  international legal regimes, the law of  the sea 
is one in which legal and political insurgency played a 
most proactive role in forging the current normative or-
der of  the oceans. In particular, the decades preceding 
the adoption of  the UNCLOS were of  intense move-
ment and witnessed a spectacular turn from the absolute 
prevalence of  the principle of  freedom of  navigation 
(mare liberum) to the ascension of  the principle of  terri-
torial sovereignty of  coastal states (mare restrictum, diffe-
rent from the mare clausum theory defended by Seldon). 
Such development did not happen overnight and above 
all, it did not rain down. To the contrary, it was the result 
of  constant objection by coastal states (some develo-
ped, most developing) to the traditional dual division 
of  the ocean into territorial sea and high seas. As one 
can imagine, opposition did not always take place wi-
thin the boundaries of  existing norms, neither of  treaty 
nor customary nature. Precisely the breaching of  norms 
preceding the adoption of  the UNCLOS was criticized 
in specialized law of  the sea literature. 
In this context, this paper identified the need for 
offering a counterweight to the traditional literature 
which defied and still defies limitations to the princi-
ple of  freedom of  the seas, even in cases where the 
prevalence of  this principle could lead, and was in fact 
leading, to unjust and predatory relations in the in-
ternational arena. It was the case of  the years before 
the III United Nations Conference on the Law of  the 
Sea(UNCfLOS). It is past time developing states embra-
ce a narrative that praises the resistance staged by fellow 
states, including Brazil, against the traditional model of  
colonial spoliation of  marine resources in coastal states’ 
adjacent waters.
Methodologically, it adopts a historiographic pers-
pective on key developments within the international 
law of  the sea, an approach inspired by but not entirely 
based on John Pocock’s contextualism, the “intellectual 
historian”.1 The historical approach followed here fo-
cuses on the heart of  the matter and on context, rather 
than on texts.2 As such, it is a provocation, a sketch in 
understanding how the phrases “creeping jurisdiction” 
and “territorialism” have been understood and used 
by international lawyers and with what consequences. 
Should it trigger some discomfort with the wide use 
of  such expression to refer to pre-UNCLOS develop-
ments, it will have fulfilled its goal.
To that intent, the paper will present specialized li-
terature that excoriated “territorialism” and “creeping 
jurisdiction” in the law of  the sea. To that parcel of  li-
terature, Brazil was viewed as “leader of  territorialists”3 
and, as such, an actor causing systemic instability in the 
oceanic rule of  law. Thus, a core part of  this essay is de-
dicated to the analysis of  Brazilian state practice before 
1  POCOCK, John Greville Agard. Languages and their implica-
tions: the transformation of  the study of  political thought. In: PO-
COCK, John Greville Agard. Politics, language and time: essays 
on political thought and history. Chicago: University of  Chicago 
Press, 3-41, 1989, pp. 3-10.
2  POHL, Reynaldo Galindo. The Exclusive Economic Zone in 
the Light of  the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of  
the Sea. In: VICUÑA, Francisco Orrego (Ed.). The Exclusive 
Economic Zone: A Latin American Perspective. Foreign Rela-
tions of  the Third World, n. 1, Boulder: Westview Press, 1984, p. 32.
3  KWIATKOWSKA, Barbara. Creeping Jurisdiction beyond 200 
Miles in the Light of  the 1982 Law of  the Sea Convention and State 
Practice. Ocean Development & International Law 22, n. 2, 
153–87, 1991, p. 163.
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and during the III UNCfLOS. It is not attempted here 
to forward a blind defense of  every stance Brazil has 
ever taken ocean-wise. This is not an exercise of  thou-
ghtless patriotism, since there are no angels in the inter-
national stage, but rational and self-interested players. 
To the contrary, this is an assessment of  the positions 
taken by that country during the III UNCfLOS, which 
may have been excessive, and the contributions given 
towards a fairer and more stable international ordre pu-
blique for the oceans.
This paper represents an effort to escape legal dog-
matism and fetishism, favoring instead an approach that 
brings together international law, international relations 
theory and historical aspects of  both. An approach that 
takes into account those power struggles behind both 
internationally agreed norms and violations of  establi-
shed customs. The international law of  the sea is an 
amazingly fertile field in this sense, as it mirrors power 
struggles and objections to established norms, having 
produced the most extraordinary international instru-
ment of  the twentieth century, the UNCLOS.4 
2. from the almost absolute freedom of the 
seas paradigm to the rise of Coastal states
The law of  the sea, as a special regime of  internatio-
nal law, consists of  and has been essentially shaped by 
the antagonism between two key legal principles: free-
dom of  the seas and territorial sovereignty. Historically, 
the field stems from a continuous clash amid conflic-
ting interests: those of  maritime powers, nations with 
primordial interest in shipping and sailing the world’s 
oceans, and those of  coastal states interested in secu-
ring resources within their adjacent waters.5 Such an ac-
4  The UNCLOS has 320 articles and was designed to regulate 
practically all uses of  the ocean, to the extent of  having been nick-
named the “Constitution of  the Oceans”, by Tommy Koh, Presi-
dent of  the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of  the 
Sea, on 11 December 1982. It goes without saying that the Conven-
tion, no matter how complete at the outset, is a product of  its time 
and has already needed modifications and revisions. It was the case 
of  the 1994 Implementing Agreement on Part XI, relating to the 
Area, and the 1995 United Nations Fish Stock Agreement, adopted 
in New York, so as to complement provisions on the conservation 
of  straddling stocks and highly migratory fisheries. 
5  MCDORMAN, Ted L. The marine environment and the 
Caracas Convention on the Law of  the Sea: a study of  the third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of  the Sea and other related 
marine environmental activities. Halifax: Dalhouise University Press, 
count lays emphasis on the distinction between “mariti-
me” and “coastal” states, a contrast based on the state’s 
ability and predicaments to sail the seas.6
On the one side, maritime or naval powers such as 
Portugal, Spain, The Netherlands, France, England, 
Canada, Russia, the United States, among others, crui-
sing every inch of  the oceans with absolute freedom, 
scooping up living resources from every metric cube, 
and trading with peoples from all parts of  the world.7 
On the other side, coastal states, a heterogeneous ca-
tegory that comprised both developed and developing 
countries. While developed coastal states set the goal to 
secure exclusive access to ocean resources, in particular 
of  the subsoil of  submarine areas, based on strategical 
and geopolitical calculations, developing coastal states 
intended to halt the harvest of  their natural resources 
by merchant fleets of  wealthier countries. Those coastal 
states brought about a sea-change in traditional mariti-
me delimitation schemes, prompted by bold jurisdictio-
nal claims. The chronological landmarks for the shaking 
of  law of  the sea’s structure are, beyond controversy, 
the 1945 Truman Proclamations.8 
1981.
6  The category of  “coastal states” is not homogeneous. Whereas 
all (powerful) maritime states are necessarily coastal states, the op-
posite does not hold true. Throughout history, until current days, 
such category has been shared by states well-off  and a mass of  de-
veloping and underdeveloped states. Belonging to the former are 
Western European countries, the US, Canada, Japan and Australia, 
to name but just a few of  the so-called First World countries. In 
the latter group, Latin American states and former African colonies, 
Middle-Eastern states, countries from South and South-East Asia, 
and Small Island Developing States. More on the topic can be found 
at VENTURA, Victor Alencar Mayer Feitosa. Tackling Illegal, Un-
regulated and Unreported Fishing: the ITLOS Advisory Opinion 
on Flag-state Responsibility for IUU Fishing and the Principle of  
Due Diligence. Brazilian Journal of  International Law (Revista 
de Direito Internacional), v. 12, issue 1, 2015, pp. 52-55.
7  Another phrase for maritime powers is “naval powers”. See 
POHL, Reynaldo Galindo. The Exclusive Economic Zone in the 
Light of  the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of  the 
Sea. In: VICUÑA, Francisco Orrego (Ed.). The Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone: A Latin American Perspective. Foreign Relations 
of  the Third World, n. 1, Boulder: Westview Press, 1984, p. 36.
8  US Presidential Proclamations No. 2667, Policy of  the United 
States with Respect to the Natural Resources of  the Subsoil 
of  the Seabed and the Continental Shelf, and No. 2668, Policy 
of  the United States with Respect to Coastal Fisheries in Cer-
tain Areas of  the High Seas, done at Washington, 28 September 
1945, 10 FR 12303. Even though the Truman Proclamation on the 
Continental Shelf  is probably the most known episode of  territo-
rial expansion seaward, it was not the first move to advance claims 
to maritime areas beyond the territorial sea. Prior developments in 
this regard include the 1942 Treaty between the UK and Venezuela 
Relating to the Submarine Areas of  the Gulf  of  Paria, which divided 
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The typical account of  the events that followed the 
Truman Proclamations, in line with traditional law of  
the sea literature, speaks of  the breeding of  an unex-
pected problem to the ordre publique océanique. A pro-
blem that began when coastal states, one after another, 
in particular following the post-decolonization wave of  
the 1960s and 1970s, unilaterally nationalized marine re-
sources, mainly fisheries, through a series of  “enclosu-
res” of  adjacent waters offshore. Those national claims 
were seen as excessive, due to the lack of  harmonious 
international practice on the matter. In this scenario, La-
tin American countries, amongst which Brazil, became 
notorious for their “territorial ambitions”.9
The stage between 1945 and the kickstart of  the III 
UNCfLOS in 197310 was, thus, predominantly marked 
by opposition to the old dual division of  the seas – the 
three-mile “marginal sea” and the high seas.11 Such 
hostility was fueled by a new set of  qualities attributed 
to oceans by the end of  World War II, which entirely 
changed their significance for nations. Until the end of  
the war, the dual division took only two dimensions of  
the seas into account: water surface and water column. 
Oceans were essentially vectors for the carriage of  goo-
ds and transport of  persons (surface), as well as sources 
of  food and vectors of  communication, via submarine 
cables (water column). 
After 1945, technological breakthroughs added 
other dimensions to the oceans: subsoil and airspace. 
At stake were not only living resources, fisheries, but es-
pecially non-living resources, such as hydrocarbons and 
minerals on and underneath the seafloor. Humankind 
was finally able to explore and exploit natural resour-
ces, namely hydrocarbons, in depths unknown to men 
before. In addition to that, technologically advanced 
the seabed and the subsoil beyond respective territorial seas at the 
Gulf, signed at Caracas, 26 February 1942, 205 LNTS 122, and ter-
minated on 23 July 1991. The Treaty was the first one in the world 
to delimit the seabed.
9  VARGAS, Jorge A. Latin America and its contributions to the 
Law of  the Sea. In: LAURSEN, Finn (Ed.). Towards a New Inter-
national Marine Order. Leiden: Nijhoff, 1982, p. 58.
10  The Conference was convened by virtue of  United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 2750 (XXV), Reservation exclusively 
for peaceful purposes of  the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the 
subsoil thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the limits of  pre-
sent national jurisdiction and use of  their resources in the interests 
of  mankind, and convening of  a conference on the law of  the sea. 
17 December 1970.
11  TREVES, Tullio. Coastal States’ rights in the maritime areas 
under UNCLOS. Brazilian Journal of  International Law (Revista 
de Direito Internacional), v. 12, issue 1, 2015, p. 41.
states were able to capitalize on energy resources from 
the airspace above water, such as wind and solar energy. 
In a nutshell, perception of  the economic and strategic 
meaning of  this pluri-dimensionality of  the seas played a 
most relevant role in precipitating objection not only 
to the traditional dual division, but also to the prepon-
derance of  untouchable freedoms. It became clear to 
international lawyers that the law of  the sea was under-
going profound changes, to such an extent that even 
during negotiation on a binding treaty for the oceans, 
statements of  a “new international law of  the sea” were 
common in literature.12
Upon adoption of  the UNCLOS in 1982, prevalen-
ce of  the principle of  freedom of  the seas was called in 
question and the balance leaned towards the principle 
of  sovereignty, as the Convention codified additional 
powers to coastal states. A most relevant factor during 
negotiations was the participation of  newly indepen-
dent African and Asian states, which embraced signi-
ficantly different positions from those of  their colonial 
predecessors. Conjointly with other Third World coun-
tries, sympathetic to the political orientation of  the so-
-called “Group of  77”,13 they played an important role 
in the III Conference. There, coastal states have fulfilled 
old demands of  exclusive jurisdiction over marine re-
sources in phenomenon that could be named as the rise 
of  coastal states.
The problem is that such rise was seen as the pro-
duct of  “creeping jurisdiction”, in which states anarchi-
cally and unilaterally asserted powers over larger areas 
of  the oceans. There has been a great deal of  doom-
sayers against creeping jurisdiction, against the enclo-
sure of  the seas, and against territorialist countries. For 
the purposes of  the law of  the sea, creeping jurisdiction 
is usually referred to as the practice by sovereign states 
of  seeking to extend territorial jurisdiction over mariti-
12  The theory of  pluridimentionality or multidimentionality of  
the oceans was originally formulated by Marotta Rangel, with the 
difference he labeled the newer dimension as “depth”, whereas to 
our understanding the dimension of  depth had already been exploit-
ed via the setting of  submarine cables since mid-nineteenth century. 
The appended dimensions were the subsoil of  submarine areas and 
the air column above the sea. See RANGEL, Vicente Marotta. O 
novo Direito do Mar e a América Latina. Revista da Faculdade de 
Direito da Universidade de São Paulo, 1981, pp. 41-42.
13  The Group of  77 advocated a more radical form of  “common 
heritage of  mankind” principle, based on the ideology underpinning 
the so-called New International Economic Order (NIEO), designed to 
rebalance economic relations between industrialized countries of  the 
North and poorly developed states of  the South. See discussion below.
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me spaces14 beyond what is permitted by international 
customary or treaty law.15 In  other words, the “exten-
sion of  municipal jurisdiction seaward along the seabed 
and from thence to the vertical column above and the 
souterrain below”16 or the “gradual extension of  State 
jurisdiction offshore”, part of  a steady jurisdictional ex-
pansionism towards the high seas.17 In short, creeping 
jurisdiction would be the power unilaterally revendica-
ted by the coastal state in violation of  existing norms, 
beyond either the maritime boundaries established the-
rein or the competences exercisable in each zone.
Key elements of  the concept are, accordingly, the 
unilaterality of  claims, and the violation of  a valid inter-
national legal rule.18 Those elements accentuate, so tra-
ditional accounts within law of  the sea literature, the 
inherent viciousness of  jurisdictional assertions and 
how much they threaten the stability of  the internatio-
nal rule of  law in oceanic affairs. In that context, cree-
ping jurisdiction has been referred to as “parcellation”,19 
“propertization”,20 and “territorialization of  the oceans” 
14  A definition of  maritime space (or area, or zone) in the law 
of  the sea is given by Treves as “areas of  the sea for which interna-
tional law prescribes spatial limits and a regime”. In each area, dif-
ferent categories of  states exercise different rights, most of  which 
are comprised under the UN Convention on the Law of  the Sea. 
TREVES, Tullio. Coastal States’ rights in the maritime areas under 
UNCLOS, p. 40   
15  In general, one could refer to the quest for enhanced power 
and authority as an inherent and essential feature of  sovereign states, 
being that one of  the reasons for the existence of  international law, 
as a limiting tool to state expansionism in different ambits of  inter-
national relations.
16  As referred by John Craven, once Chief  Scientist of  the US 
Navy. For that reason, the practice of  creeping jurisdiction is also 
known as Craven’s Law, as referenced in BURKE, William. Law, Sci-
ence, and the Ocean. Natural Resources Law, vol. 3, 1970, p. 215 
note 41.
17  KAYE, Stuart. Freedom of  navigation in a Post 9/11 World: 
security and creeping jurisdiction. In: Law of  the Sea: progress and 
prospects. Oxford: OUP, 2006, p. 347.
18  To Erik Frankx, the expression “creeping” “includes the idea 
of  unilateral action directed at upsetting a legal framework adhered to 
by the majority of  other States”. Besides, for a detailed view on the 
origins of  the expression “creeping jurisdiction”, see FRANCKX, 
Erik. The 200-Mile Limit: between creeping jurisdiction and creep-
ing common heritage. German Yearbook of  International Law, 
48, 2005, p. 136.
19  BROWN, Edith. Maritime Zones: A Survey of  Claims. In: 
CHURCHILL, Robin, Simmonds K. R. and WELCH Jack (Eds.). 
New Directions in the Law of  the Sea. London: The Eastern 
Press, Ltd., 1973, pp. 157-192.
20  Gary Knight uses this expression in the context of  discussions 
on the most adequate regime to deep-sea mining, so as to make 
a point that a system of  free enterprise and minimal regulation would 
be best tailored for the exploitation of  deep seabed minerals. In so 
via unilateral declaration of  “psycho-legal boundaries at 
sea”.21 Those are unquestionably powerful phrases, whi-
ch lay bare their author’s stance: angst that the freedom 
of  the seas would be at stake.22 
In light of  the considerations supra, it seems rele-
vant to, even more than three decades into the signatu-
re of  the Convention, consolidate a Southern narrative 
for the law of  the sea. In particular, it seems relevant 
to dispute the mainstream account that coastal state 
jurisdictional expansion seawards happened as the re-
sult of  a vile act of  creeping jurisdiction in maritime 
zones that otherwise would be free to all and benefit 
the entire world. It should be born in mind at all times 
that that “freedom” is a relative capacity, i.e. only those 
financially powerful and technologically advanced had 
the choice to navigate large parcels of  the world oceans, 
explore and exploit its natural resources. Without signi-
ficant funds, freedom was but a catch phrase – and was 
that the reality of  several developing coastal states.  
A first step in that quest is to challenge the pejora-
tive meaning and use of  the phrase “creeping jurisdic-
tion”. Next, it is imperative to inspect the Brazilian state 
practice until 1973 and the official positions adopted by 
the Brazilian delegation during the III UNCfLOS, with 
the purpose of  debunking misconstructions of  Brazil 
as a destabilizing actor within the international commu-
nity. Portraying Brazil as the leader of  “territorialists” is 
not the problem per se. It becomes a problem when the 
quest for exclusive access to natural resources and, thus, 
to social, environmental and economic development, is 
associated with territorialism, understood as a corrosive 
practice to the stability of  the public ocean order.     
doing, states would rely on the “propertization” of  the seabed to 
develop a regime that would recognize property rights over seabed 
resources. See KNIGHT, Gary. Legal Aspects of  Current United 
States Law of  the Sea Policy. Paper presented to AEI conference, 
October 19, 1981, p. 13.
21  BOOTH, Ken. Naval Strategy and the Spread of  Psycho-legal 
Boundaries at Sea. International Journal, vol. 38, n. 3, Ocean Poli-
tics, 1983, pp. 373-375.
22  Consternation with the expansion of  coastal state jurisdiction 
nowadays is expressed by Bernard Oxman, who calls into question 
the very stability of  the jurisdictional system reached at UNCLOS, 
as the author analyzes episodes of  excessive claims after the adop-
tion of  the Convention. See OXMAN, Bernard H. Territorial Temp-
tation: a siren song at sea. The American Journal of  International 
Law, vol. 100, n. 4, 2006, pp. 833-837.
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3. what is wrong with the phrase “Creeping 
JurisdiCtion”?
Traditional law of  the sea scholarship tends to share 
two grounding premises for proclaiming the viciousness 
of  all kinds of  jurisdictional creep: firstly, that freedom 
of  navigation is an overriding principle, one that pre-
cedes all others, the long-standing heart of  the law of  
the sea;23 secondly, that coastal states are inherently at-
tracted to increased power and authority24 and, as such, 
are doomed to always pursue enlarged jurisdiction over 
maritime spaces. There is little room for challenging the 
second premise, especially if  one considers states to be 
rational and self-interested agents.25 However, that first 
premise should not go undisputed, particularly because 
of  freedom’s trait as “the” core element in traditional 
law of  the sea. In fact, “freedoms of  the high seas are 
freedoms under the law. They should be viewed increa-
singly as no different from other fundamental rights of  
States under international law”.26 
The main problem with the widespread phrase 
“creeping jurisdiction” is that it does not neutrally de-
pict the claims of  coastal states prior to the adoption of  
UNCLOS.27 That expression is value-laden and descri-
bes a wicked practice, which may not be the case of  the 
systematic opposition to the ordre publique of  the oceans 
before 1982. Anne Peters, in a sharp critique against the 
23  See BECKER, Michael A. The Shifting Public Order of  the 
Oceans: Freedom of  Navigation and the Interdiction of  Ships at 
Sea. Yale Law Review, 2005, p. 132. See also LAGONI, Rainer. 
Marine Protected Areas in the Exclusive Economic Zone. In: 
KIRCHNER, Andre (Ed.), International Marine Environmen-
tal Law: institutions, implementation and innovations. Kluwer 
Law International, 2003, pp. 157-167. See also KRASKA, James. 
… , p. 148. Kraska is of  the view that the coastal states and distant 
water states have sets of  absolute rights in the EEZ. 
24  Maria Gavouneli speaks of  coastal State’s “tendency to expand 
seawards”. See GAVOUNELI, Maria. Functional Jurisdiction in 
the Law of  the Sea. Nijhoff, 2007, p. 59.
25  That states are rational agents, which always act so as increase 
their absolute power capacities, is the core of  realist and rational 
choice theories of  international relations. See GOLDSMITH, Jack 
L. and POSNER, Eric A. The Limits of  International Law. Ox-
ford: OUP, 2005, p. 5. 
26  ANDERSON, David. Freedom of  the High Seas in the Mod-
ern Law of  the Sea. In: The Law of  the Sea: progress and pros-
pects. Oxford: OUP, 2006, p. 345.
27  It is beyond the object of  this paper to analyze the accusations 
of  creeping jurisdiction and territorialism by coastal states after the 
adoption of  the UNCLOS, not for lack of  thematic pertinence, but 
for lack of  space. Such an analysis is being carried out in the author’s 
doctoral research at the University of  Hamburg.
once fashionable alarmism amongst internationalists as 
to the “fragmentation” of  international law, pondered 
that “the term ‘fragmentation’ is inevitably descriptive-
-evaluative, and thus loaded. ‘Fragmentation’ has a pre-
dominantly negative connotation, it is a pejorative term 
(rather than diversity, specialization, or pluralism). Fi-
nally, it is a term which describes not only a legal pro-
cess in the real world of  law but has also been a label for 
the accompanying discourse (mostly among academics, 
less among judges, and even less among political law-
-making actors)”.28 
Replace the phrase “fragmentation” by “creeping ju-
risdiction” and the resulting text would make as much 
sense. In fact, the notion of  creeping jurisdiction is 
descriptive-evaluative, assuming a rather negative con-
notation. It is a term that describes not only a behavior 
by coastal states, but has been used as a label to raise ap-
prehension to an allegedly disorder-creating movement 
in the law of  the sea – a view that takes long-established 
customary laws and the pre-UNCLOS order for abso-
lute, which was by far not the case.29 
The verb “to creep” in the language of  Shakespeare 
means “to enter or advance gradually so as to be almost 
unnoticed”. As an adjective, it means “advancing by slow, 
imperceptible degrees”.30 A similar connotation inclu-
des “happening very slowly so that people do not notice”,31 
which, if  applied to the rule of  ocean law, underscores 
the surreptitious way in which jurisdictional assertions 
by coastal states would occur. It would perhaps make 
sense to describe some excessive claims effected after 
the adoption of  UNCLOS, but it fails to comprehend 
the systematic antagonism of  coastal states both to the 
traditional dual division of  oceans and to the dominan-
ce of  an unfair freedom of  the seas.
28  PETERS, Anne. Refinement of  International Law: from frag-
mentation to regime interaction and politicization. MPIL Research 
Paper Series, n. 2016-19, 2016, p. 2.
29  Cases of  Latin American objection to the then valid custom-
ary legal order of  the oceans began as early as 1947, with the fa-
mous Chilean Declaration. A thorough list of  unilateral state acts 
and multilateral declarations can be found in GARCÍA-AMADOR, 
The Latin American Contribution to the Development of  the Law 
of  the Sea. American Journal of  International Law, 68, n. 33, 
1974, p. 33.
30  Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Entry “Creeping”.
Available at: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/creep-
ing. Last visited on 24.09.2017.
31  MacMillan Dictionary. Entry “Creeping”.
Available at: http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/brit-
ish/creeping. Last visited on 24.09.2017.
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It is no novelty that countries performing the 
staunchest objection to the jurisdictional expansion of  
coastal states are mainly located in Europe and North 
America.32 Coincidently, authors denouncing the “ex-
pansionist movement” prior to UNCLOS originate or 
have been trained in those regions. Ironically though, 
the founder of  the expression “creeping jurisdiction” 
was an American. When John Craven coined the phra-
se during the 1960’s, the US Navy revealed profound 
concern with jurisdictional assertions by coastal states 
to rights not just over the seafloor and subsoils of  the 
continental shelf  (as the US had done in 1945), but 
over the water column as well. Only then, alarm was 
sounded with an edge of  seriousness. In other words, 
as long as the unilateral expansion seawards was limi-
ted to the seabed, there was little reason to bother.33 
However, once territorialization meant restrictions to 
freedom to research, fish and, potentially, to navigate 
(note, potentially), the phenomenon sparked uneasiness 
amid maritime states.
As it seems, such protestation would be the reflex of  
a hegemonic narrative, in which a particular actor “seeks 
to make its particular project or interest or pursuit seem 
the general project or interest”.34 The universalizing of  
the freedom of  the seas principle alongside the demo-
nization of  creeping jurisdiction indicate the defense 
of  a particular political order of  the oceans. Here, the 
concept of  “universalization vocabulary”, by Martti 
Koskenniemi,35 seems particularly helpful to an analysis 
32  The United Kingdom and the The Netherlands, for instance, 
oppose the interpretation of  UNCLOS according to which coastal 
states may forbid military exercises on their EEZs. On another level, 
the US were the only country to present a note verbale to the Com-
mission for the Limits of  the Continental Shelf  (CLCS) pending the 
analysis of  the Brazilian submission for delineating the outer limits 
of  the continental shelf. If  anything, such object shows concerns 
by the naval superpower with potential territorial jurisdiction of  the 
Brazilian state on the South Atlantic.  
33  True, there had been some reaction against the extension of  
coastal state jurisdiction over the continental shelf  within the US, as 
in KUNZ, Joseph L. Continental shelf  and international law: con-
fusion and abuse. American Journal of  International Law, 50, 
1956, pp. 828-853 and HENKIN, Louis. International law and “the 
interests”: the law of  the seabed. American Journal of  Interna-
tional Law, 63, n. 3, 1969, pp. 504-510. However, such opposition is 
not comparable in intensity with the critiques against the expansion 
of  coastal state jurisdiction over the water column. 
34  KOSKENNIEMI, Martti. International Law in Europe: be-
tween tradition and renewal. European Journal of  International 
Law, 16, pp. 113-124, 2005, p. 115.
35  KOSKENNIEMI, Martti. Hegemonic Regimes. In: YOUNG, 
Margaret (Ed.). Regime Interaction in International Law: fac-
ing fragmentation. CUP, 2012, p. 311.
of  the reiterate use of  the expression “creeping jurisdic-
tion” in law of  the sea monographies. In fact, maritime 
powers have been claiming to have the correct unders-
tanding of  significance and scope of  jurisdiction rules 
in the law of  the sea.36 Such particular understating is 
expected (by their holders) to be universal, as it allege-
dly derives from human nature and human reason – in 
a dangerous process of  naturalizing legal norms. This 
rather authoritarian view denies the plurality of  topoi ba-
sed on which international legal argumentation is made 
possible.37 A major problem lies, thus, on the judgmental 
nature of  legal analyses about Latin American “jurisdic-
tional creeps” onto the high seas. This view ignores that 
international law has always been and will continue to 
be, in essence, a battlefield for competing understandin-
gs and opposing interpretations of  certain rules – juris-
diction in the law of  the sea being no exception.   
For the purposes of  this article, the kind of  disorder 
that happens to promote general fairness and justice is 
36  On the military level, an example of  such universalization can 
be found in a letter from Admiral Jay L. Johnson of  the U.S. Navy 
to Senator Jesse Helms. The then Chief  of  Naval Operations stated 
that “it is the U.S. Navy and not the Convention that guarantees the 
navigational freedoms upon which we and the rest of  the world depend 
for peace, stability, and economic prosperity” (emphasis added). See 
Letter from Chief  of  Naval Operations Admiral Jay L. Johnson to 
the Hon. Sen. Jesse Helms, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Jun. 29, 2000. Available at: http://www.virginia.edu/
colp/pdf/ADMJohnsonLtr-Chariman-Helms.pdf  For more on the 
letter, as well as on the U.S. Navy views on coastal state powers in 
the EEZ, see KRASKA, James. Maritime Power and the Law of  
the Sea: Expeditionary Operations in World Politics. Oxford: OUP, 
2011, pp. 134-149. 
37  A rhetorical view of  international law sees moral values and 
judgments behind the pretended assertiveness of  positive law and 
focuses on the study of  the so-called topoi, or places, or cultural (rela-
tive) elements, which influence the perception of  law that a nation 
has. On the legal level, Rhetorics as a methodology originates from 
the rethorical turn, in light of  the limitations faced by the Kelsenian 
objectivist theory of  law. At that time, Theodor Viehweg emerged 
as one of  the main exponents of  the argumentative theory, con-
ceiving Jurisprudence, the object of  legal science, as a procedure 
for discussing problems. For the rhetorical reasoning, the starting 
line is no longer the blackletter of  the law, but the controversial 
principles, or topoi, that directly influence legal interpretation. This 
makes Rhetorics known for operating in the field of  legitimacy (not 
of  positive legality), in which it seeks the uncoercive persuasion as 
to certain world views. Those views do not assume a cogent na-
ture, as it happens with the legal positivism, since they are located 
in the domain of  dubium, the uncertain. For more on the rhetorical 
turn, see VIEHWEG, Theodor. Tópica y Jurisprudencia. Madrid: 
Civitas, 2007, p. 149. Thus, it seems perfectly possible to establish a 
parallel between Rhetorics and the functioning of  international law, 
especially because the Kelsenian objectivist theory is not best suited 
for the job of  explaining how international law works.
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justifiable, and the pre-UNCLOS legal regime of  abso-
lute prevalence of  the freedom of  the seas over coastal 
states’ jurisdiction was all but fair.38 Customary law dis-
ciplining access to marine resources did not take into 
account the special needs of  developing and least deve-
loped coastal states. General dissatisfaction with the ru-
ling order was such that negotiating parties to the UN-
CLOS III dedicated a paragraph of  the Convention’s 
Preamble to highlight State parties’ commitment to the 
“maintenance of  peace, justice and progress for all peo-
ples of  the world”.39 The Convention was negotiated 
on the widely shared assumption that the pre-UNCLOS 
economic (and oceanic) order was inadequate, what 
made a just and equitable international economic or-
der due.40 Needless to say, the new order ought to take 
particular note of  the special interests and needs of  de-
veloping countries. To that purpose, Brazil were among 
the most proactive countries to engender efforts during 
the UNCLOS III negotiations and to push for a “new” 
law of  the sea. 
4. brazilian praCtiCe between 1945 and 
1982 
Throughout history, Brazil has not always been the 
“bogeyman” of  the law of  the sea. In general terms, the 
country has been an active participant to international 
oceanic negotiations, having ratified most of  the treaties 
both in the law of  the sea and maritime law. The large 
number of  international instruments signed and ratified 
by the Brazilian state signify the country’s dedication to 
the international rule of  law applied to oceans. Exam-
ples of  those instruments are the following. On the 
38  For a valuable concept of  fairness in international law, see 
TOURME-JOUANNET, Emmanuelle. What is a Fair Interna-
tional Society? International Law Between Development and Rec-
ognition. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013, pp. 1-4.
39  “Prompted by the desire to settle, in a spirit of  mutual under-
standing and cooperation, all issues relating to the law of  the sea and 
aware of  the historic significance of  this Convention as an impor-
tant contribution to the maintenance of  peace, justice and progress 
for all peoples of  the world.” UNCLOS, Preamble, UNTS 1833, 
34, 35, 10 December 1982.
40  “Bearing in mind that the achievement of  these goals will con-
tribute to the realization of  a just and equitable international eco-
nomic order which takes into account the interests and needs of  
mankind as a whole and, in particular, the special interests and needs 
of  developing countries, whether coastal or land-locked”. UNC-
LOS, Preamble, UNTS 1833, 34, 35, 10 December 1982.
conservation of  marine living resources: Convention 
for the Regulation of  Whaling, Washington 2 Decem-
ber 1946;41 Convention on the Conservation of  Tuna 
and Related Fish of  the Atlantic, Rio, 14 May 1966;42 
on May 16, 1975, Brazil adhered to the Antarctic Treaty, 
Washington, December 1, 1959.
Regarding maritime, shipping and navigational 
affairs, Brazil has signed and ratified the following ins-
truments: Convention on the Safeguarding of  Human 
Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the Rules to Prevent Collision 
at Sea, London 5 1960;43 Convention on Civil Liability 
for Damage Caused by Oil Pollution, Brussels, Novem-
ber 29 1969;44 Convention on International Regulations 
to Avoid Collisions at Sea, London, 20 October 1972;45 
Convention for the Facilitation of  International Mariti-
me Traffic, London, 9 April 1965; Convention on Car-
go Lines, London, 5 April 1966;46 Convention for the 
Prevention of  Pollution Caused by Ships (MARPOL), 
London, 2 November 1973, and the respective Proto-
col, signed on 17 January 1978;47 and potentially others 
not central to this paper.
Concerning the country’s notoriety for advancing 
excessive territorialist claims, it must be borne in mind 
that, in the decades preceding the UNCLOS’ signatu-
re, Brazil either upheld the three-mile territorial sea or 
pressed for a limit not broader than twelve miles. That 
stance abruptly changed in the wake of  international 
developments, so as to adapt to international power 
struggles and to strategical considerations made at the 
domestic level, in particular with regard to national se-
curity preferences and the conservation and exploita-
tion of  marine resources.
4.1. The five Brazilian stances on coastal state 
jurisdiction before 1973: The U-Turn
Until 1973, there were five identifiable periods in 
the Brazilian positions concerning the length of  mariti-
me spaces over which the state exercised some degree 
of  jurisdiction.48 During the first period, spanning from 
41  Promulgated by Decree No. 73.497, 17 January 1974.
42  Promulgated by Decree No. 65.026, 20 August 1969.
43  Promulgated by Decree No. 60.696, 8 May 1967.
44  Promulgated by Decree No. 79.437, 28 March 1977.
45  Promulgated by Decree No. 80.068, 2 August 1977.
46  Promulgated by Decree No. 66.103, 22 January 1970.
47  Approved by Legislative Decree No. 4, 1987.
48  This temporal taxonomy was drafted by RANGEL, Vicente 
Marotta. Brazilian Law of  the Sea. Revista de Direito da Univer-
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the Brazilian formal independence in 1822 until 1914, 
Brazil enforced a former Portuguese provision on coas-
tal state sovereignty over the adjacent seas, the famous 
“cannon-shot rule”.49 The rule was then replaced in 
1914 by the more modern three-mile rule, which was 
first provided for by Instruction No. 43 of  the Ministry 
of  Foreign Affairs of  August 25 of  that year.
The three-mile rule was upheld by the Brazilian sta-
te, but not without questioning. In fact, during the 1930 
Codification Conference, the Brazilian delegation pu-
shed for the enlargement of  the territorial sea, so as 
to allow the state more regulatory and administrative 
maneuver room over an important sea belt so close to 
the mainland. Consequently, the Brazilian delegation fa-
vored a six-mile territorial sea during the Conference.50 
Since the first half  of  the twentieth century, there 
had been dissatisfaction with the pre-UNCLOS dual-
-division of  the oceans.51 As Fraser wrote in 1926, “one 
country will claim three miles, another four miles, ano-
ther six miles”, with such diversity resulting in harmful 
effects to international trade and political relations.52 
The likelihood of  conflicts led delegates of  47 states 
to meet in The Hague in 1930 with the arduous task 
of  codifying and developing international law in several 
fronts, not only in oceanic matters.53 Three topics were 
at the table, amongst which the codification of  territo-
rial waters, its limits and competences therein. 
However, codification efforts stranded. So, the Bra-
zilian government established a 12-mile contiguous 
zone, valid also to exclusive fishing.54 Failure to codify 
an internationally agreed instrument led, as mentioned 
supra, to the Truman Proclamations. The rest of  the 
story is relatively well known. In short, several Latin 
sidade de São Paulo, pp. 71-89, 1973, p. 74. 
49  The legislation on the cannon-shot was adopted in Lisbon, via 
Decree of  4 March 1804.
50  RANGEL, Vicente Marotta. Brazilian Law of  the Sea. Revista 
de Direito da Universidade de São Paulo, pp. 71-89, 1973, p. 75.
51  Already then, during the first half  of  the twentieth century, the 
international community had identified pressing issues connected to 
ocean uses, in special the degree of  coastal state powers offshore 
and the over-exploitation of  high seas fisheries, both intimately in-
tertwined
52  FRASER, Henry S. Extent and Delimitation of  Territorial Wa-
ters. Cornell Law Quarterly, 11, 1925, p. 457.
53  The Conference was convoked by the League of  Nations. See 
League of  Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement, No. 21, 
at 10.
54  Fishing Code, approved by Decree No. 23.672 of  January 2, 
1934.
American states took a similar course of  action and de-
clared some degree of  jurisdiction over their adjacent 
seas, triggering a phenomenon that McDorman names 
“the great expansion of  coastal state jurisdiction.”55
Following the US Proclamations, there was a se-
quence of  three short-lived periods in Brazilian posi-
tions. In 1950, Brazil declared that its continental shelf  
was an integral part of  the national territory.56 The Fe-
deral Constitution of  1967 also provided that the “sub-
marine shelf ” be listed as property of  the federal state.57 
This period marks the birth of  a gradual detachment 
from the 3-mile territorial sea rule, particularly in light 
of  on-going discussions on the need for an internatio-
nally binding instrument on the delimitation of  mariti-
me zones, so as to prevent anarchy in the seas.
Thus, the third period began in 1966 and was cha-
racterized by a 6-mile territorial sea plus 6-mile conti-
guous zone.58 Although the contiguous zone was esta-
blished for the purposes of  customs, fiscal, sanitary and 
immigration matters, Brazil had therein the same rights 
of  fishing and exploration of  living resources enjoyed 
in the territorial sea. Shortly after that, in 1969, Brazil 
enlarged the territorial sea “to a belt of  twelve nautical 
miles breadth, measured from the low water line”.59 
The “straw that broke the camel’s back”, the move 
that rendered Brazil’s fame as “leader of  territorialists”, 
was the proclamation of  a 200-mile territorial sea in 
1970.60 Before that, Brazil was the only country in Sou-
th America that had not declared a 200-mile jurisdic-
tion zone – only as late as 1966 had Brazil replaced the 
three-mile territorial sea rule.61 Until then, the country 
55  MCDORMAN, Ted L. The marine environment and the 
Caracas Convention on the Law of  the Sea: a study of  the third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of  the Sea and other related 
marine environmental activities. Halifax: Dalhouise University Press, 
1981, p. 2.
56  Provided for in Decree No. 26.840 of  November 8, 1950.
57  Article 4 (3), Federal Constitution, 24 January 1967.
58  Brazil: Decree-law No. 44 of  November 18, 1966
59  Decree-law No. 553 of  April 25, 1969.
60  Decree-law No. 1.098 of  March 25, 1970; approved by Con-
gress by means of  legislative Decree No. 31 of  May 27, 1970.
61  The first Latin American states to forward national claims to 
expanded jurisdiction seaward were bathed by the Pacific Ocean, 
in particular Chile. In that sense, early unilateral jurisdictional as-
sertions had a “compensatory nature”, since those states has nar-
row continental margins and were, thus, negated the sort of  riches 
secured under the Truman Proclamation. See POHL, Reynaldo 
Galindo. The Exclusive Economic Zone in the Light of  the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of  the Sea. In: VICUÑA, 
Francisco Orrego (Ed.). The Exclusive Economic Zone: A Latin 
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was willing to push carefully for an enlarged contiguous 
zone, a perception that changed for political and eco-
nomic reasons. Politically, the military regime gained 
stability and overcame the turbulence following the de-
flagration of  the 1964 coup d’état that overthrew the 
elected President João Goulart. Economically, a series 
of  geological surveys carried out by Petrobras on the 
East coast, within 150 miles from Rio de Janeiro, revea-
led hydrocarbon reserves. Uncertainty as to the precise 
location of  these reserves may have been yet another 
reason for declaring a 200-mile territorial sea.62
In conjunction with the militaries’ ascension to 
power, came a stronger emphasis on sovereignty requi-
rements for the protection and international projection 
of  the nation, added to the plan to increase decision-
-making autonomy of  the Brazilian foreign policy. Tho-
se were pillars of  the “Brasil Grande Potência” policy, 
defended by the regime.63 Archives of  the Brazilian Mi-
nistry for Foreign Affairs host eleven notes repudiating 
that unilateral decision, all of  which from developed 
countries: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Japan, Norway, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of  
Germany, Sweden and the Soviet Union.64
The next step was to deny accession to the 1958 
Geneva Conventions. On the one hand, this decision 
could be seen “legally feasible”,65 as Brazil was not par-
ty to any treaty on the issue of  maritime delimitation. 
However, it could also be argued that customary law 
has been established on a length between three and not 
farther than twelve nautical miles from the baselines. In 
so doing, Brazil relied on the pressing need for ensuring 
productivity of  its marine natural resources, namely 
fisheries and particularly in light of  growing exploita-
tion by foreign fishing vessels.66 The technical abyss in 
American Perspective. Foreign Relations of  the Third World, n. 1, 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1984, p. 34.
62  Revista Veja, São Paulo, 09 June 1971, p. 27.
63  CARVALHO, Gustavo de Lemos Campos. O mar territorial 
brasileiro de 200 milhas: estratégia e soberania, 1970-1982. Revista 
Brasileira de Política Internacional, n. 42, pp. 110-126, 1999, p. 
110.
64  See CASTRO, Luiz Augusto de Araújo. O Brasil e o Novo 
Direito do Mar: Mar Territorial e Zona Econômica Exclusiva. 
Brasília: FUNAG, 1989, p. 30.
65  See RANGEL, Vicente Marotta. Brazilian Law of  the Sea. 
Revista de Direito da Universidade de São Paulo, pp. 71-89, 
1973, p. 78.
66  According to the Brazilian Navy Vice-Admiral Paulo Irineu 
Roxo de Freitas, “the devastation provoked by foreign fishing fleets 
in certain regions of  the coast of  Africa has already caused the ex-
tinction of  icthyological species, similarly to what had happened on 
the fishing industry between developed and developing 
countries was to be felt with a particular note, as the 
“Lobster War” with France in 1963 denoted.67
The declaration of  a 200-mile territorial sea was a 
lucid decision, one taken upon strategical security con-
siderations. The main reason behind it is simple: a 200-
mile belt was the space the Brazilian Navy appraised as 
necessary for the maintenance of  national security. The 
government understood that a twelve-mile territorial sea, 
even if  supplemented by fishing agreements, “could har-
dly lead to the modification of  this negative outlook”.68 
In addition to the security thoughts, Brazil sensed the 
need to reinforce solidarity bonds with neighboring Latin 
American countries, which had for decades adopted na-
tional legislation designing some sort of  200-mile zone.69
This quick overview of  the Brazilian positions in the 
decades preceding the UNCLOS negotiations and the 
the coasts of  Peru and Ecuador and to what still happens on the 
coasts of  Brazil”. As referenced in RANGEL, Vicente Marotta. Bra-
zilian Law of  the Sea. Revista de Direito da Universidade de São 
Paulo, pp. 71-89, 1973, p. 79.
67  The “Lobster War”, with France, was a quarrel involving cabi-
net talks, exchanges of  notes, and even complicated interpretations 
of  how lobsters behave in their natural habitats. The whole episode 
centered around the following arguments: Frenchmen argued that 
they were fishing off  the territorial sea, whereas Brazilians coun-
tered that despite the 3-mile territorial sea, fishing occurred on the 
continental shelf. See CARVALHO, Gustavo de Lemos Campos. O 
mar territorial brasileiro de 200 milhas: estratégia e soberania, 1970-
1982. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, n. 42, pp. 110-
126, 1999, p. 114.
68  RODRIGUEZ, Carlos Calero. O Problema do Mar Territorial. 
In: Mar Territorial, vol II, Ministry of  Navy, Brasilia, 1972, p. 576.
69  The first concerted effort at the international level was headed 
by Chile, Ecuador and Peru, and resulted in the Declarations of  San-
tiago, adopted in 1952. In the first Declaration, concerning fishing 
problems in the South Pacific, all parties show consternation with 
the “lack of  protection which endangers the conservation of  fishing 
resources” and the “serious threat of  exhaustion” of  those resourc-
es offshore. By acknowledging an urge to exercise prescriptive and 
enforcement jurisdiction relating to the conservation of  fisheries, 
the parties to the Declaration set off  to “ensure a better yield for 
the benefit of  national food supplies and economics”. Joint Dec-
laration Concerning Fishing Problems in the South Pacific, 
signed at Santiago on 18 August 1952. UNTS 1006, p. 318-9. equally 
important is the 1970 Montevideo Declaration on the Law of  the 
Sea, signed by nine Latin American states in a combined effort to 
promote acceptance of  their 200-mile claims by creating a regional 
consensus on the matter. The Declaration of  Montevideo on the 
Law of  the Sea, 9 I.L.M., no. 5, ASIL, pp. 1081-1083, signed on 8 
May 1970. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Peru, and Uruguay signed the Montevideo Declaration on 
the Law of  the Sea. For more on this, see GARCÍA-AMADOR, 
The Latin American Contribution to the Development of  the Law 
of  the Sea. American Journal of  International Law, 68, n. 33, 
1974, p. 34, note 5.
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relevance that the ocean has to the Brazilian reality offer 
necessary elements for an enhanced understanding of  
the array of  positions defended by the county between 
1973 and 1982. As seen above, Brazil widened the limits 
of  its territorial sea, first to six, then to twelve70 and 
finally to two hundred nautical miles.71 As a developing 
country with a long coastline and sensitive interests in 
the economic, sovereignty, scientific and environmental 
facets of  the oceans, Brazil participated intensely in the 
negotiations leading to the approval of  the Convention 
in Montego Bay on 10 December 1982.
4.2. Brazilian positions during the III UN 
Conference on the Law of the Sea: questioning 
maritime hegemonisms
The III UNCfLOS was negotiated in three main com-
mittees.72 Of  those, the Second Committee was manda-
ted to elaborate on jurisdiction and maritime zones, inclu-
ding the EEZ and continental shelf. Unsurprisingly, that 
panel witnessed heated debates over three main thorny 
issues: recognition of  the rights claimed by states whose 
continental shelf  extended for more than 200 miles; the 
system of  payments and contributions provided for in 
article 82 of  the negotiating text; and a solution to the as-
pirations of  the land-locked and geographically disadvan-
taged countries. The aim was, thus, to construct a legal 
framework capable of  preventing or settling disputes ori-
ginating from the extension of  territorial waters and the 
adoption of  the concept of  the economic zone, as well as 
from the delimitation between the continental shelf  and 
the international area. At the end of  the day, negotiations 
were needed because “where there had previously been 
a single jurisdiction there would be a plurality of  powers, 
giving rise to new conflicts”.73
70  Decree-Law 553, of  25 April 1969.
71  Decree-Law 1.098, of  25 March 1970. This Decree was imple-
mented by Executive Decree n. 68,459 of  1971, which established 
two fishing zones of  100 mm each, the first - except for special 
cases not stated - for fishing only for Brazilians, while the second 
allowed fishing by foreigners, provided that they were authorized 
by the country.
72  The committees dealt respectively with the deep-seabed re-
gime, the traditional law of  the sea, the protection of  the marine 
environment, marine scientific research and transfer of  technology 
and the informal plenary dealing with the settlement of  disputes and 
general and final clauses. 
73  A/CONF.62/SR.59 59th Plenary meeting Extract from the 
Official Records of  the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of  the Sea, Volume V.
During the Conference, Brazil prioritized the pro-
motion of  self-interests, amongst others: national secu-
rity, via extending the length of  the waters where coas-
tal states exercise a considerable authority; socioeconomic 
development, via guaranteeing exclusive access to marine 
resources both over a 200-mile zone and an even larger 
portion of  the seafloor, which would extend beyond 
200nm; geopolitical influence, via defending a solidarity-ba-
sed approach to the resources of  the deep-sea beyond 
national jurisdiction.74 In so doing, Brazil joined forces 
with different constellations of  negotiating parties, so-
metimes closer to broad-margin developed states, so-
metimes show more affinity with developing states, de-
pending on the topic under discussion.75 
For instance, as official discussions started in 1973, 
there was an international outcry for a larger zone under 
some amount of  national jurisdiction.76 Such concept 
would be later labelled the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ). To the purpose of  consolidating such a zone, 
Brazil joined an informal group of  countries that later 
would be known as the “club of  pioneers”.77 Not that 
Brazil had been a “pioneer”, since it had made no bald 
unilateral assertions until 1966. What Brazil did was to 
jump onto the passing tram, adding plenty of  momen-
tum to claims that would have otherwise remained weak 
and unorganized, without support of  larger developing 
74  During UNCLOS III negotiations, Brazil had the following 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs: Mário Gibson Barbosa (1969-1974), 
Azeredo da Silveira (1974-1979) and Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro 
(1979-1985).
75  For a critical position against the Brazilian standing during 
UNCLOS III, for having favored excessively interests of  developed 
nations, see IMBIRIBA, Maria de Nazaré Oliveira. Do princípio do 
patrimônio comum da humanidade. São Paulo. PhD Thesis. Law 
Faculty, University of  São Paulo, 1980, p. 106.
76  For a list of  Latin American national laws, together with sub-
regional declarations advancing the 200-mile zone, see GARCÍA-
AMADOR, The Latin American Contribution to the Development 
of  the Law of  the Sea. American Journal of  International Law, 
68, n. 33, 1974, p. 33.
77  According to Pohl, the group of  pioneers was composed by 
Central and South American states, which between 1947 and 1967, 
claimed more than a 3-mile jurisdictional zone offshore. Those pio-
neers “mounted a generally weak and largely uncoordinated effort 
at the 1958 Conference on the Law of  the Sea. There were so few 
of  them that they were on the defensive. Latin America’s voices 
were isolated, submerged, and drowned out in an atmosphere in 
which the overwhelming strength of  the European masters of  inter-
national law was seen in one of  its last displays”. POHL, Reynaldo 
Galindo. The Exclusive Economic Zone in the Light of  the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of  the Sea. In: VICUÑA, 
Francisco Orrego (Ed.). The Exclusive Economic Zone: A Latin 
American Perspective. Foreign Relations of  the Third World, n. 1, 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1984, p. 35.
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countries and newly independent African states.78 
However, on the same EEZ, Brazil made clear a po-
sition against the legality of  military maneuvers with the 
use of  weapons and explosives without consent of  the 
coastal state. In fact, the country strived for the Conven-
tion to be more unequivocal on the rights and duties of  
states within the EEZ, so that “military activities such 
as maneuvers with the use of  weapons and explosives 
should not be carried out in the zone without the con-
sent of  the coastal State”.79 The deployment of  military 
installations and devices on the continental shelf  would, 
thus, be subject to prior consent, a move that would re-
present a stark drawback against powerful navies worl-
dwide. In this regard, Brazil assumed a leading role in 
seeking the expansion of  coastal state powers over the 
maritime zones under national jurisdiction.
To that end, Brazil has made a reservation upon sig-
nature of  the UNCLOS.80 For the country, the EEZ 
must be governed by the principle of  utilization for 
exclusively peaceful purposes, a view which conflicts 
with the interpretation given by military naval powers, 
to whom military drills may have a peaceful purpose. 
On this regard, a most sensate stance is espoused by 
Pohl, to whom there is immense difference between na-
vigation of  military vessels, which falls under the right 
of  innocent passage, and naval maneuvers or ostensive 
naval presence offshore, contemplating the installation 
of  sensing apparatus, arms testing, and other activities 
that may be perceived as threats to national security.81 
Another bone of  contention during negotiations, 
78  Concerning the EEZ, political positions embraced by Latin 
American states were backed nationally by academics. Renowned 
scholars boosted the EEZ as feasible solution for a reinvigorated 
ocean order, amongst them Orrego Vicuña, Marotta Rangel, Teresa 
Infante, García-Amador, Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, Hugo Caminos, 
and others.
79  A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.53 53rd meeting of  the Second Com-
mittee Extract from the Official Records of  the Third United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of  the Sea, Volume IX, para. 3.
80  Paragraph V of  the Brazilian Reservation to the UNCLOS: 
“The Brazilian Government understands that the provisions of  the 
Convention do not authorize other States to carry out in the exclu-
sive economic zone military exercises or manoeuvres, in particular 
those that imply the use of  weapons or explosives, without the con-
sent of  the coastal State”. Brazilian Declaration Upon Signature 
of  the UNCLOS, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982.
81  POHL, Reynaldo Galindo. The Exclusive Economic Zone 
in the Light of  the Third United Nations Conference on the Law 
of  the Sea. In: VICUÑA, Francisco Orrego (Ed.). The Exclusive 
Economic Zone: A Latin American Perspective. Foreign Rela-
tions of  the Third World, n. 1, Boulder: Westview Press, 1984, p. 55.
and even after them, was the coastal state’s power over 
artificial installations and structures in the EEZ and on 
the continental shelf. The Brazilian interpretation of  
such right was rather ampliative and saw exclusivity of  
the Brazilian state to “construct and to authorize and 
regulate the construction, operation and use of  all types 
of  installations and structures, without exception, whatever 
their nature or purpose”.82 In other words, the coastal 
state has full discretion as to any islands, installation and 
structures present in its EEZ, and not just in physical 
contact with the continental shelf. This comprehensive 
position may be viewed by some as being in violation of  
UNCLOS Article 56 (1) (b) (i), which does not mention 
“all” islands, installations and structures. This matter is 
highly polemic and subject to differing interpretations 
until the present day.
A bold stance embraced by the Brazilian delegation 
related, also, to the enforcement jurisdiction of  the 
coastal state over the EEZ. For Brazil, the Convention 
should concede enforcement powers to the coastal Sta-
te with regard to all rights referred to in article 56, not 
merely to rights over living resources.83 According to 
the Brazilian delegation, a coastal State should be enti-
tled to exercise its sovereign rights over the non-living 
resources of  its economic zone as well. The aim was to 
include energy resources under the exclusive economic 
jurisdiction of  coastal states, such as wind, wave and 
solar energy.84
Apart from that, a spotlight struggle concerned the 
freedom of  scientific research on the continental shelf  
beyond 200nm. Although the continental shelf  regime 
was negotiated to be unitary (with rules and duties that 
apply equally to the continental shelf  with and beyond 
200nm), some countries backed up a proposal to loo-
sen coastal states’ rights in favor of  researching states. 
According to the architects of  such proposal, the move 
would “liberalize” the regime of  the continental shelf  
beyond 200nm, so as to allow for a balance between 
rights of  researched and researching states.85 
82  Paragraph V, Brazilian Declaration Upon Signature of  the 
UNCLOS, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982.
83  A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.53, para 9. 
84  A/CONF.62/SR.104 104th Plenary meeting Extract from the 
Official Records of  the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of  the Sea, Volume IX, para 21.
85  USA, Sweden, Federal Republic of  Germany, Italy, Hungary 
etc. See records of  the 126th plenary meeting of  the 2nd Committee. 
For the Hungarian delegation, the freedom of  scientific research 
would only be effected if  a specific research regime be established for 
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The Federal Republic of  Germany, for instance, held 
that a restrictive provision on scientific research within 
and beyond 200nm would hamper the development of  
every marine scientific research (MSR) – a negative ou-
tcome for the international community. According to 
declarations by the Federal German delegation, it was 
in the “general interest” to promote marine scientific 
research, which depended heavily on cooperation and 
efforts by all states.86 With that, the country stood out 
as one of  the staunchest opponents to the Brazilian po-
sition on marine scientific research. A similar stance was 
embraced by the Swedish delegation, to whom mari-
ne scientific research in the economic zone and on the 
continental shelf  beyond 200nm should be subject to 
only a few restrictions.87 
Brazil considered proposals for a different regime 
for marine scientific research on the continental shelf  
beyond 200nm as an attempt to undermine coastal sta-
tes’ rights.88 For that reason, it continuously opposed 
any such attempts,89 and defended a uniform regime of  
consent both for the EEZ and the continental shelf. In 
that, the country was supported by other broad-margin 
states, namely Argentina,90 Ecuador,91 Guyana,92 New 
the continental shelf  beyond 200nm. See para. 8, Report of  the 128th 
Meeting of  the 2nd Committee.
86  A/CONF.62/SR.135 135th Plenary meeting Extract from the 
Official Records of  the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of  the Sea, Volume XIV, para 61.
87  136th Plenary meeting Extract from the Official Records of  
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of  the Sea, Vol-
ume XIV, para 63.
88  In such an opinion, Brazil was sided by New Zealand, whose 
delegation considered that the dual regime of  article 246 represent-
ed a “further derogation from the rights of  broad margin states”. 
See A/CONF.62/SR.126 126th Plenary meeting Extract from the 
Official Records of  the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of  the Sea, Volume XIII, para 80.
89  A/CONF.62/SR.126 126th Plenary meeting Extract from the 
Official Records of  the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of  the Sea, Volume XIII, para 129.
90  The Argentinian delegation envisaged the dual regime for 
MSR on the continental shelf  as a “further sacrifice of  the legitimate 
interests of  coastal States and a further restriction on their sovereign 
rights over the continental shelf ”. See A/CONF.62/SR.126 126th 
Plenary meeting Extract from the Official Records of  the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of  the Sea, Volume XIII, 
para. 89.
91  For Ecuador, “Coastal States alone had the right to carry out, 
control, authorize, suspend or refuse permission for scientific re-
search”. See Idem, para. 117.
92  To the Guyanian delegation, coastal state’s sovereign rights 
over the continental shelf  would “suffer from ambiguity”, should a 
specific and parallel regime for scientific research on the continental 
shelf  be established. See A/CONF.62/SR.128 128th Plenary meet-
Zealand, Uruguay,93 the Philippines,94 Mozambique,95 
and others. Of  those, Uruguay considered the “libera-
lization” to amount in practical terms to the “deroga-
tion” of  the rule of  consent for research in the EEZ and 
on the continental shelf.96 Those states claimed right or 
discretion over scientific research on the continental 
shelf, both within and beyond 200nm.97 
Opposing the Brazilian view were countries as the 
US98 and Norway,99 which defended the application of  
freedom of  scientific research on the continental shelf  
to applied researches, or “resource-oriented research”. 
To that argument, the Brazilian delegation replied that 
a virtual monopoly of  marine scientific research within 
a few states could not be perpetuated. A most suited 
way to interrupt such monopoly would, thus, be to de-
velop a full consent regime. For Brazilian negotiators, it was 
clear that article 246, paragraph 6, would not create a 
dual system for scientific research on the continental 
shelf, to the contrary, article 246 “confirmed the coastal 
State’s sovereignty over the shelf, in the exercise of  whi-
ch the coastal State might waive some of  its rights”.100 
ing, para. 181. 
93  For Uruguay, “research activities carried out on the continental 
shelf  beyond 200 miles, the formula ultimately agreed upon must 
not limit the sovereign rights of  the coastal State as recognized in 
customary and treaty law”. See A/CONF.62/SR.128 128th Plenary 
meeting Extract from the Official Records of  the Third United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of  the Sea, Volume XIII, para. 55.
94  A/CONF.62/SR.128 128th Plenary meeting, para. 73.
95  The Mozambican delegation “could not accept the idea of  
freedom of  research on the continental shelf ”. A/CONF.62/
SR.139 139th Plenary meeting Extract from the Official Records 
of  the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of  the Sea, 
Volume XIV, para 31. 
96  A/CONF.62/SR.128 128th Plenary meeting Extract from the 
Official Records of  the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of  the Sea, Volume XIII, Ninth Session, para 55.
97  The Pakistani delegation was even of  the view that “the exer-
cise by the coastal State of  a right or discretion regarding withhold-
ing consent or ordering suspension or cessation of  a project in its 
exclusive economic zone or on its continental shelf  could not be 
made subject to any dispute settlement procedure or conciliation 
proceedings without its consent”. A/CONF.62/SR.127 127th Ple-
nary meeting Extract from the Official Records of  the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of  the Sea, Volume XIII, para. 145
98  The American delegation favored the “liberalization of  the 
regime of  marine scientific research applied only to the continental 
shelf  beyond the exclusive economic zone and not within the zone. 
See A/CONF.62/SR.113 113th Plenary meeting, para. 63.
99  A/CONF.62/SR.128 128th Plenary meeting Extract from the 
Official Records of  the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of  the Sea, Volume XIII, para. 214.
100  136th Plenary meeting Extract from the Official Records of  
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of  the Sea, Vol-
ume XIV, para 32.
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Ultimately, a more liberal regime for scientific re-
search activities over the outer continental shelf  was 
adopted in UNCLOS Article 246 (6). Therefore, the 
wording chosen by the Brazilian delegation was not 
fully consistent with the Convention’s, as sovereignty is 
too a strong expression to describe the rights possessed 
by the coastal state over the continental shelf. However, 
the main message of  that declaration was to question 
and oppose attempts to bend coastal states’ powers 
over continental shelf  riches and resources. 
Finally, a discussion in which Brazil intervened seve-
ral times during the III UNCfLOS dealt with the ten-
sion between the continental shelf  beyond 200nm and 
the internationalization of  the deep seabed (the Area), 
as formulated in Resolution 2749.101 In this regard, Bra-
zil defended its interests as a broad-margin country.102 
On the one hand, consideration for the New Internatio-
nal Economic Order (NIEO) premises were expressed 
in the Brazilian support for the internationalization of  
the deep seafloor, which would be placed under a regi-
me of  res communis and benefit and technology sharing 
between developed and developing states. On the other 
hand, the country advanced the possibility of  an outer 
continental shelf, i.e. extending beyond 200nm.
The particularity of  this issue is that other develo-
ping states starkly objected any continental shelf  exten-
sion beyond 200nm, fearing the private appropriation 
of  the deep seabed by technologically advanced states. 
Hence, a group of  African, Arab and Land-locked sta-
tes opposed the very existence of  domestic jurisdiction 
over those areas (or resources). Any extension beyond 
200nm would imply a derogation of  the common he-
ritage principle and a practical reduction of  the extent 
of  the Area.103 
The list of  countries opposing the extended con-
tinental shelf  includes: Zaire,104 Swaziland, to whom 
101  United Nations General Assembly. Declaration of  Prin-
ciples Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the 
Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of  National Jurisdiction. 
Resolution 2749, A/RES/25/2749, 12 December 1970.
102  In that, Brazil was joined by Canada (who considered the 
revenue-sharing mechanism contained in article 82 to be a substan-
tial concession made in good faith by broad-margin states). See A/
CONF.62/SR.102 102nd Plenary meeting Extract from the Official 
Records of  the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of  the 
Sea, Volume IX, para. 9.
103  It was the case of  Yugoslavia, para 80 and Romania, para. 88, 
during the 134th plenary meeting. 
104  A/CONF.62/SR.138 138th Plenary meeting Extract from 
the Official Records of  the Third United Nations Conference on 
UNCLOS article 76 “severely truncated the concept of  
the common heritage of  mankind, which was already 
limited in scope by the 200-mile exclusive economic 
zone”,105 Syria,106 Bulgaria (to whom the outer conti-
nental shelf  implied an “appropriation of  the ocean 
space”),107 Libya,108 Algeria,109 Ghana,110 Malta (who 
claimed for more safeguards against the “shrinkage 
of  the common heritage of  mankind”),111 Tunisia,112 
Kuwait,113 Yugoslavia,114 among others.
To some countries, the formulae contained in UN-
CLOS article 76 tended to “accentuate inequalities” and 
to affirm a doctrine of  appropriation based on geo-
political advantages”.115 Severe concern was displayed 
by Tonga, to whom article 82, providing for payments 
and contributions with respect to the exploitation of  
the continental shelf  beyond 200 nautical miles, seemed 
the Law of  the Sea, Volume XIV, para 92.
105  A/CONF.62/SR.138 138th Plenary meeting Extract from 
the Official Records of  the Third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of  the Sea, Volume XIV, para 131.
106   A/CONF.62/SR.139 139th Plenary meeting, para 172.
107  A/CONF.62/SR.103 103rd Plenary meeting Extract from 
the Official Records of  the Third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of  the Sea, Volume IX, para 56.
108  According to the Libyan position, If  the proposed interna-
tional sea-bed authority was to have due competence and to be able 
to explore and exploit efficiently the resources of  such areas, the 
continental shelf  must not extend beyond the 200-mile limit. See A/
CONF.62/SR.104 104th Plenary meeting, para 66.
109  The Algerian delegation fully supported the position of  the 
Arab group, which would place a limit on the prolongation of  the 
continental shelf. Otherwise, the concept of  the common heritage 
of  mankind would be infringed. Any formula which would have the 
effect of  reducing the common heritage of  mankind could not be 
supported. Idem, para. 74.
110  To Ghana, it was essential that the outer limit of  the conti-
nental shelf  should not exceed 200 nautical miles if  activities on the 
sea-bed beyond the limits of  national jurisdiction were to be regu-
lated for the benefit of  mankind as a whole, in accordance with the 
concept of  the common heritage of  mankind. See A/CONF.62/
SR.105 105th Plenary meeting, para 26.
111  See A/CONF.62/SR.105 105th Plenary meeting, para 36.
112   A/CONF.62/SR.127 127th Plenary meeting Extract from 
the Official Records of  the Third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of  the Sea, Volume XIII, para 60.
113  To Kuwait, any extension of  the continental shelf  beyond 
200 miles from the baselines from which the breadth of  the ter-
ritorial sea was measured would constitute an encroachment on the 
common heritage of  mankind. See A/CONF.62/SR.128 128th Ple-
nary meeting Extract from the Official Records of  the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of  the Sea, Volume XIII, para 94. 
114  A/CONF.62/SR.134 134th Plenary meeting Extract from 
the Official Records of  the Third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of  the Sea, Volume XIV, para. 80. 
115  Stance held by the Bulgarian delegation. A/CONF.62/
SR.103 103rd Plenary meeting, para 56.
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to indicate a certain “guilty conscience”. If  the parties 
would endorse the outer continental shelf, not even the 
revenue-sharing arrangements would compensate for 
the large losses of  the international community.116 
It does not mean that Brazil and other developing 
states with similar position objected the birth of  the in-
novative concept of  a “common heritage of  mankind”. 
To the contrary, the Brazilian stance combined support 
for larger outer limits of  the continental shelf  with the 
internationalization of  the deep seabed. Back at the day, 
commentators opposing the restrictive approach to the 
exploitation of  the international seabed criticized deve-
loping states’ and Brazilian position of  being a treason 
to fellow (underdeveloped) countries, given that most 
rentable resources would fall under national jurisdic-
tion and not be accountable for the revenue-sharing 
mechanism enshrined at UNCLOS Article 82.117 Other 
scholars accentuated the so-called NIEO “paradox”, 
which was to lay emphasis on common responsibilities 
for overcoming poverty, while advancing particular in-
terests and unilateral sovereign claims.118
The paradox argument was a simplistic way of  
analyzing a most complex context, claiming that the 
“fillet mignon” of  marine resources should remain 
beyond national jurisdictions and be subject to freedom 
of  access and exploitation. In brief, a regime in whi-
ch technologically advanced states could feast, so that 
developing states could earn crumbs originating from 
financial contributions of  7% over the commercial va-
lue of  extracted resources. If  such would be the legal 
regime of  the Area nowadays, the international society 
would potentially be witnessing once again the ludicrous 
trade relations between the powerful and the subdued, 
in which developing countries would be trading gold for 
trinkets. In this sense, the combination between “sove-
reignty” (in conceiving the EEZ and outer continental 
shelf) and “humanity” (in applying the common herita-
ge principle to the Area) represented a most compelling 
weapon in the struggle for a renewed international law 
116  Position defended by the Romanian delegation, A/CONF.62/
SR.125 125th Plenary meeting, para. 26.
117  DANZIG, Aaron L. A funny thing happened to the com-
mon heritage on the way to the sea. San Diego Law Review, 12, 
n. 3, 1975, pp. 655-664, p. 656. See also CAUBET, Christian. Fun-
damentos politico-econômicos da apropriação dos fundos 
marinhos. Florianópolis: UFSC, 1977, p. 95.
118  VITZTHUM, Wolfgang Graf. A new international economic 
order and a new global maritime regime. Law and State. Tübingen, 
v. 19, 1979, pp. 7-24, p. 10.
of  the sea.119
Privileges to developed nations would have been 
exacerbated even further in the deep seabed regime, 
were it not for Arvid Pardo’s proposal of  a common 
heritage principle.120 In fact, had the freedoms of  the 
high seas ruled over the deep seabed, “the developed 
States of  the West, which alone could muster the ne-
cessary investment and technology, would be the main 
beneficiaries of  sea-bed mining”.121 To remove those 
resources from the individual reach of  developed ma-
ritime states, while simultaneously asserting exclusive 
economic jurisdiction over marine resources in a larger 
adjacent sea-belt to shore, were alternatives found by 
developing countries to tackle the inherent unfairness 
in previous rules of  international law. 
5. ConClusion: has brazil been a bogeyman 
or a Catalyst for Change in the law of the 
sea? 
Criticisms against territorialism and creeping juris-
diction of  coastal states in the law of  the sea allow a few 
conclusions on the dominant theses in specialized lite-
rature. Firstly, most analyses give priority to the princi-
ple of  freedom of  navigation, the unofficial overriding 
principle, to the detriment of  territorial sovereignty and 
socioeconomic development. Secondly, the practice of  
putting forward jurisdictional assertions is depicted as 
excessive and undesirable in every scenario and, there-
fore, damaging to the maintenance of  peace and order 
in the world oceans.122 Early unilateral claims prior to 
1982 had violated customary law and newer claims have 
infringed UNCLOS provisions. 
Those are views espoused by the law of  the sea 
doctrine bred in policy and research centers of  the de-
119  PUREZA, José Manuel. O patrimônio comum da hu-
manidade: rumo a um direito internacional da solidariedade? 
Porto: Afrontamento, 1998, p. 175.
120  United Nations General Assembly. Declaration of  Prin-
ciples Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the 
Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of  National Jurisdiction. 
Resolution 2749, A/RES/25/2749, 12 December 1970.
121  CHURCHILL, Robin and LOWE, Vaugham. The Law of  
the Sea. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983, p. 157.
122  See, for instance, BURKE, William. Law, Science, and the 
Ocean. Natural Resources Law, vol. 3, 1970; and GOLDIE, L. 
International Principles of  Responsibility for Pollution, Columbia 
Journal of  Transnational Law, vol. 9, 1970.
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veloped North, opinions grounded on a good deal of  
legalism and dogmatism. In this context, a Southern 
narrative could make itself  be heard in a most crystalli-
ne way; a narrative objecting traditional privileges and 
centuries of  hegemony featured by maritime powers; 
a narrative that perceives the field as a compound of  
juridico-political constructs stemming from political stru-
ggles. It was so with the disputes for a territorial sea 
of  twelve nautical miles, since the 1930s, for a 200-mile 
exclusive economic zone, for an outer continental shelf, 
for an internationalized deep seabed subject to the 
common heritage principle, and, nowadays, for enhan-
ced marine environmental protection. 
Territorialist positions in the pre-UNCLOS ocean 
order were crucial, as they defied the model of  colo-
nial spoliation which inspired the law of  the sea until 
that time.123 The opposite of  the so-called “jurisdictio-
nal creep” would, thus, be a spoliative jurisdiction, one that 
connotes the colonialist origins of  international law as 
legal system that favored technologically advanced coas-
tal states through overwhelming prestige to the freedom 
of  seas in detriment to the economic needs of  develo-
ping coastal states. Such prestige was none other than 
the direct result of  the primary role played by maritime 
states in shaping the public order of  the oceans over the 
course of  history.124 
In this context, Brazil played an important part in 
catalyzing changes, partially due to the country’s size, 
economic status, and political clout. By affirming sove-
reignty over the 200-mile zone, Brazil and other deve-
loping countries obtained decisive bargaining power for 
international negotiations during the III Conference. 
Ultimately, Brazilian practice prior to the adoption of  
the UNCLOS were instrumental to the emergence of  a 
123  As claimed by George Galindo in a previous publication in 
this Journal, the history of  international law is inescapably linked 
to the practice of  international law. In the case of  the law of  the sea, 
generalized practice held that an ancient dual-division of  the oceans 
was unfair in the light of  technological developments, thereby justi-
fying the (usually seen as) heinous jurisdictional expansion of  coast-
al states seawards. For more on the relevance of  a critical history of  
international law, one in which lawyers understand past practices to 
assess the current challenges of  international law, see GALINDO, 
George Rodrigo Bandeira. Para que serve a História do Direito In-
ternacional? Brazilian Journal of  International Law (Revista de 
Direito Internacional), v. 12, issue 1, 2015, p. 339.
124  “Over the course of  history, powerful maritime states have 
played the primary role in shaping the public order of  the oceans”, 
in BECKER, Michael A. The Shifting Public Order of  the Oceans: 
Freedom of  Navigation and the Interdiction of  Ships at Sea. Yale 
Law Review, 2005, p. 131.
“new law of  the sea”, one sensitive to social, economic 
and human needs, which sees in maritime spaces not 
just the ideal landscape for navigation, but also the trea-
sures capable of  satisfying various needs of  peoples. As 
knowledgeably alluded by Vicente Marotta Rangel,125 a 
law of  the sea focused on enhancing life conditions of  
each people and of  humanity as a whole. 
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